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“What cannot be helped must be
indured”: Coping with Obstacles to
Business During the Anglo-Dutch
Wars, 1652–1674
SIOBHAN TALBOTT
By nature, wars appear hostile to commerce, bringing disruption
to international relations and to everyday life. By focusing on the
individuals involved in continuing commerce, however, an
increasing body of scholarship has shown that merchants in a
number of contexts continued to operate successfully during
periods of war. This article builds on these recent methodological
shifts in business history, applying them to the three Anglo-Dutch
wars of the seventeenth century. Although these conflicts have
been described as being harmful to commerce, there has been no
focus hitherto on merchants’ experiences of or responses to these
wars. This article addresses this problem and, in so doing, pro-
poses a different way of analyzing and thus characterizing the
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relationship between the Anglo-Dutch Wars and business.
Through examining the surviving correspondence of merchants
operating during these wars, I investigate the various methods
used—both successfully and unsuccessfully—to navigate obsta-
cles to business during these conflicts. The value of considering
this activity in broader British and European contexts is explored,
and the range of concerns exhibited by merchants during these
periods of conflict is analyzed, showing that war was not para-
mount among their concerns, despite the political context.
Throughout, I show that although all three Anglo-Dutch Wars
had an impact on commerce, this was not necessarily negative,
and that the most enterprising and proactive merchants benefited
from commercial opportunities created by the conflicts.
Keywords: earlymodern; business andwar;merchants; commerce
In December 1672, the Norwich merchant and textile manufacturer
Thomas Baret wrote to Rowland Cockey in Amsterdam to ask him to
“direct me to secure [my goods] from the enimies at home or abrode.”1
Operating during the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672–1674), Baret was
just one ofmanymerchantswho sought to pursue commerce despite an
outwardly hostile climate. The seventeenth century has long been
characterized as a period of “general crisis,” with Europe frequently
erupting into episodes of armed conflict that brought disruption to
international relations and everyday life.2 By nature, wars seem partic-
ularly hostile to international commerce—they brought with them
higher taxes, increased customs duties, the pressing of men and ships
for service, an increase in privateering and piracy, and restrictions on
trade. As an increasing body of scholarship is starting to show, how-
ever, merchants active in a number of early-modern European and
American contexts were able to continue to operate during periods of
war, with some degree of commercial success.3 By looking at the indi-
viduals who continued to stimulate commerce, rather than focusing on
the outwardly hostile political climate, these studies have taught us a
1. Norwich Record Office [NRO] MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Rowland
Cockey, December 11, 1672, Norwich, 5.
2. Notably Hobsbawm, “The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century,” 44–65;
Trevor-Roper, “The General Crisis,” 31–64; Parker and Smith, eds., The General
Crisis of the Seventeenth Century.
3. Talbott, Conflict, Commerce and Franco-Scottish Relations; Croft, “Trading
with the Enemy”; Marzagalli, “Was Warfare Necessary for the Functioning of
Eighteenth-Century Colonial Systems?”; Haggerty, “Merely for Money”?, 198, 204;
Hancock, Citizens of the World, 279; Gervais, “Facing and Surviving War”; Truxes,
“Dutch and Irish Cooperation.”
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great deal about how andwhy business continued during conflicts, and
what strategies merchants adopted in order to cope with war.
This article addresses these issues in the context of the three Anglo-
Dutch wars of the seventeenth century. The Anglo-Dutch wars, fought
between 1652–1654, 1665–1667 and 1672–1674, had by the mid-1990s
“faded into relative obscurity.”4 The lack of scholarly attention afforded
to themwas a result of two things: first, the similarities between England
and theDutchRepublic aremore readily apparent than their differences,
as both were Protestant Republics when the first war broke out; second,
the Dutch wars do not fit into the conventional narrative that the seven-
teenthcenturywasdominatedbyconflict betweenBritain andFrance. In
recent years, the Anglo-Dutch wars have begun to be rescued from this
alleged obscurity, and debates have abounded about how and why con-
flict broke out between two nations that bore so many parallels.
While the Anglo-Dutch wars continue to be described in some quar-
ters as “one of the very fewmajor conflicts in Britain’s history which can
be ascribed in themain to commercial rivalry,”5 elsewhere this interpre-
tation has been rightly challenged, and the three wars were fought for
different reasons and in different circumstances. The passing of the first
Navigation Act in 1651 has been seen by some as the apogee of Anglo-
Dutch economic rivalry and a direct cause of the outbreak of the first
war,6 and certainly this act, and those that followed, had implications for
merchants’ business.7 Contemporary commentators highlighted mari-
time and economic rivalry as central to Anglo-Dutch tensions, with
Samuel Pepys recording Captain Coeke’s observation that “the trade of
the world is too little for us two, therefore one must down,”8 reflecting
contemporary mercantilist concepts of trade as a zero-sum game in
which participants competed over a finite amount of wealth.9 “Early-
modern thinkers did not all consider they lived in a zero-sumworld,”10
however, and many years ago Charles Wilson called for scholars to
consider political and strategic as well as economic influences on the
outbreak of thewars, criticizing “those accountswhich attribute thewars
4. Jones, The Anglo-Dutch Wars, 4.
5. Israel, “CompetingCousins,” 17; see alsoDavis,EnglishMerchant Shipping,
1, 28.
6. Beer, The Origins of the British Colonial System, 385–386, cited in Wilson,
Profit and Power, 53; Farnell, “The Navigation Act of 1651,” 440.
7. The First Navigation Act (October 9, 1651), in Scobell, Acts of Parliament,
pt. ii, 176; The Second Navigation Act (September 13, 1660), in Pickering, The
Statutes at Large from the Magna Charta, 7:452ff.
8. Wheatly, Diary of Samuel Pepys, February 2, 1664.
9. As described by Joel Mokyr in The Enlightened Economy, 64.
10. Pincus and Robinson, “Wars and State-making Reconsidered,” 9; see also
Leng, “Commercial Conflict and Regulation,” 933–935.
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quite simply to the Navigation Acts.”11 John Shovlin concludes that
although the seventeenth-century Anglo-Dutch conflicts were the “best
candidates for the label ‘war for trade,’” there were many other motiva-
tions for these conflicts, and that “it is reductionist to claim that the chief
impetus for anywar is economic.”12 Similarly, Gijs Rommelse notes that
all “three Anglo-Dutch wars of the seventeenth century were caused by
political and economic rivalry,”with the secondwar in particular being
born in part out of political processes and pressure from the London
mercantile community.13 Steven Pincus suggests that the first war was
“the result of an unusual political alliance between apocalyptic Protes-
tants and classical republicans who dominated English political
culture,” and presents English concerns about Dutch economic aggran-
dizement before the outbreak of the second war not as purely secular or
economic, but bound up with fears of a Dutch pursuit of a universal
monarchy.14 The third war, which saw the unlikely alliance of England
and France as part of the larger Franco-Dutch conflict, has been less
commonly described as a trade war, being recognized instead as a
planned war of political aggression.15
The differences in the causes of these three wars are politically and
historically important, inevitably impacting their progression and their
ultimate consequences. But although this period saw a growing influ-
ence of some sectors of the mercantile class on economic policy,16 the
majority of merchants paid little heed to the causes of conflicts being
waged on a political level. As we will see, the restrictions and anxieties
caused by all three Anglo-Dutch wars impacted merchants in similar
ways in each of these conflicts, and their responses and behavior were
not markedly different depending on which Anglo-Dutch war they
were functioning during. In one particular case, surviving source mate-
rial documents the business relationship of two merchants—Thomas
Pengelly and Samuel Davis—who continued their business through
both the second and third wars, allowing us to compare their
approaches within each of these conflicts.
11. Wilson, Profit and Power, v.
12. Shovlin, “War and Peace,” 306, 308.
13. Rommelse, The Second Anglo-Dutch War, 12. Rommelse has provided
succinct summaries of historiographical developments, here 11–12, and in Rom-
melse, “The Role of Mercantilism,” 591–595.
14. Pincus, Protestantism and Patriotism, 14; Pincus, “Popery, Trade and Uni-
versal Monarchy,” 29. Pincus’s thesis has been developed further by Tony Claydon:
Rommelse, “Mountains of Iron and Gold,” 246.
15. Jones, The Anglo-Dutch Wars, 10, 13; Groenveld, “The Seventeenth-
Century Anglo-Dutch Wars,” 174.
16. For more on this, see: Leng, “Commercial Conflict and Regulation,” 943;
Brenner,Merchants and Revolution, 3; Pincus, Protestantism and Patriotism, 13–14;
Rommelse, The Second Anglo-Dutch War, 12.
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Whatever the cause of the Anglo-Dutch wars—collectively or
individually—they were in many ways maritime conflicts in their exe-
cution: theywere fought at sea and“involveda…momentous struggle for
maritime supremacy.”17 Despite this context, however, the impact of
these wars on international business has been largely overlooked, as
scholars have focused their attention on analyzing the complex causes
of their outbreak.When thewars’ consequenceshavebeen contemplated,
focushas beenprimarily on their impact at a state level: onnational losses
to privateering fleets and dwindling government coffers, supporting
the assumption that the conflicts were by their nature damaging to trade.
Both the first and secondwars have been described as bringingmaritime
trade to a “standstill,” and the second as “disastrous for English
commerce.”18 When England and France joined forces against the
Dutch in the third war, a crash in the Amsterdam Exchange “temporarily
paralyzed the entire Dutch trading system,” leading to “the almost total
cessation of Dutch seaborne traffic in European waters for nearly two
years.”19 It has been asserted that the wars were “harmful to the com-
merce of both sides,”20 but there has been little focus on merchants’
experiences of or responses to the wars, creating a story that does not
fully reflect the realities of continuing business during these conflicts.
We gain a much clearer picture of the experiences of merchants “on
the ground” as they navigated the challenges of this period if we prior-
itize merchants’ business and personal correspondence. In doing
precisely this, this article builds on recent methodological shifts in
commercial and business history. Qualitative approaches that place
the actions of individuals who were directly involved in business at
the heart of commercial histories have broadened our understanding of
international exchange.21 There are, of course, limitations to this
approach—there are inevitable questions about representativeness
and the survival rates of source material—but as Stephanie Decker
suggests, this sort of “data collection (and analysis) stands up in com-
parison with what social scientists do,” not least in providing rich
details about the business lives and struggles that lie behind broad
political contexts or statistical data.22 This is particularly the case in
17. Ormrod, The Rise of Commercial Empires, 1; Klooster, “Anglo-Dutch Trade
in the Seventeenth Century,” 261.
18. Ormrod, The Rise of Commercial Empires, 37; Rommelse, “Mountains of
Iron and Gold,” 263; Rommelse, The Second Anglo-Dutch War, 189–190.
19. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 293–294.
20. Ball, Merchants and Merchandise, 202.
21. This includes, but is not limited to: Haggerty, The British-Atlantic Trading
Community; Lamikiz, Trade and Trust in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World;
Talbott, Conflict, Commerce and Franco-Scottish Relations.
22. Decker, “The Silence of the Archives,” 169.
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a period when independent entrepreneurs and businessmen in provin-
cial ports operated alongside (and beyond the regulations of) the pow-
erful metropolitan trading companies that monopolized official trading
routes.23 Throughout this article, the surviving correspondence of three
merchants in particular provides a lens through which to explore mer-
chant activity in seventeenth-century Europe beyond the monopolists.
These are Henry Thompson, a merchant in Hull who maintained busi-
ness with the Netherlands during the First Anglo-Dutch War; George
McCartney, a Belfast merchant active during the second war; and the
Norwich merchant and cloth manufacturer Thomas Baret, who traded
with the Netherlands throughout the third war. Analysis of their corre-
spondence is supportedby other surviving evidence,where appropriate,
demonstrating that although we may only have a small number of large
corpuses of surviving material to work with, the actions of these three
merchants were demonstrably not unrepresentative when it came to the
methods adopted to continue business during the Anglo-Dutch wars.
This article is specifically concerned with merchants’ reactions to
the wars and with practical aspects of business and does not aim to
wade into the fierce, established debates regarding the causes and
nature of the Anglo-Dutch wars that usually characterize studies of
them; readers can explore for themselves the diverse literature on this
topic highlighted earlier and in the notes to this article. Similarly,
though the impact of the Anglo-Dutch wars were felt beyond Europe,
in the colonies of both the English and the Dutch, there is not roomhere
to do justice to an analysis of the conflicts’ impact across the Atlantic
Ocean and on the Indian subcontinent.24 Focus here is on the impact of
the Anglo-Dutch wars on European trade, and on British merchants’
responses to these crises. The first part of this article acknowledges the
economic impact of the wars on a state level, beforemerchants’ records
are scrutinized to explore the effect that the wars had on merchants’
behavior and to highlight merchants’ responses to the conflicts. The
various methods by which commercial agents navigated—both suc-
cessfully and unsuccessfully—the obstacles they faced are illumi-
nated, and the value of considering the Anglo-Dutch wars in broader
European and British contexts is emphasized. In the second part,
I examine the range of concerns expressed by merchants during
23. See later discussion of the role of the Merchant Adventurers and those
individuals operating outside the jurisdiction of regulated companies during the
Anglo-Dutch Wars.
24. For analysis of the impact of the Anglo-Dutch wars on colonial trade, see:
Klooster, “Anglo-Dutch trade in the Seventeenth Century,” 275-277; Russo and
Russo, Planting an Empire, 111–112; Rupert, Creolization and Contraband, 74; de
Vries, “The Dutch Atlantic Economies,” 8; Hatfield, “Dutch and New Netherland
Merchants,” 207; Jones, The Anglo-Dutch Wars, 11–12.
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periods of conflict, showing that they worried primarily about other,
less predictable problems than war: issues with manufacturing, rela-
tions with business associates, and the challenges of trading across
cultural barriers—problems that were not unique towartime. Through-
out, I show that although all three Anglo-Dutch wars made conditions
difficult for some merchants, many others continued to pursue their
business successfully, and some benefited from the commercial oppor-
tunities created by conflict. Despite the claims of some previous schol-
arship, the correspondence examined here shows us that, for the most
enterprising of merchants, business during the Anglo-Dutch wars did
not stand still.
Obstacles to Business and Merchants’ Coping Mechanisms
At the government level, some financial losses were ascribed directly
to Anglo-Dutch conflict. During the third war, the customs officers for
Bristol recorded a loss to government coffers of £9340 15 08 from the
“ships lost this yeare” (for the twelve months from September 1672),
which was directly attributed to this being “an entire yeare of war.”25
Estimations of how many prizes were taken by privateering fleets are
prominent in a great deal of scholarship on the Anglo-Dutch wars,26
with figures calculated for the first war leading to the conclusion that
it was “unquestionably the greatest single maritime disaster” suffered
by the Dutch during their Golden Age.27 Not all consequences of
participation in the Anglo-Dutch wars were negative for the state,
however. James Farnell asserts convincingly that “rather than injur-
ing England’s overseas commerce, a result often assumed by histo-
rians, the [First Anglo-] Dutch War seems to have advanced her direct
carrying trade in several important areas.”28 England’s trade with
Spain expanded, as Spanish wool was diverted from both Holland
and France to England, and the collapse of England’s Baltic trade
following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 was reversed. Anglo-
French trade had taken place via the Low Countries since a dispute
25. Bristol Record Office 12964/1/40, “Abstract of moneys collected by Isaac
Morgan and John Ramsey, collectors at port of Bristol,” 1672–1674. Figures for 1672
and 1674 are accompanied by notes that “halfe this year was war with the Dutch.”
26. For example, Murdoch, The Terror of the Seas, 278–279; Israel, Dutch
Primacy in World Trade, 208–210, 273–274; Israel, “Competing Cousins,” 20–21;
Lunsford,Piracy andPrivateering, 17, 115, 242n83;Ormrod,TheRise of Commercial
Empires, 276; Rommelse, “Prizes andProfits,” 153–4; Rommelse, “English Privateer-
ing Against the Dutch Republic,” 27–28; Boxer, The Anglo-Dutch Wars, 23, 39, 60;
Jones, The Anglo-Dutch Wars, 29–30.
27. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 210.
28. Farnell, “The Navigation Act of 1651,” 451.
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in 1649 regarding French prohibitions on English wool and tin, and
the First Anglo-Dutch War saw this practice cease, heralding a return
to traditional Anglo-French trading patterns.29 After the outbreak of
the third war “the exchange on Holland [was] 16 per cent in favor of
London.”30 Privateering activities allowed England to acquire supe-
rior Dutch shipping technology,31 and throughout all three Anglo-
Dutch wars, Dutch shipping techniques and organization were appro-
priated in British ports.32
To understand the commercial impact of the Anglo-Dutch wars
fully, however, we must look beyond consequences felt at the state
level and examine the experiences of thosemerchants operating during
the conflicts. During the first war, the Hull merchant Henry Thompson
reported to Thomas Benson “tidings of the takeing of a londener bound
for hambrough within the river, & of severall Hollands men of war that
were there soe that intent of sudan dispatching away a ship thither is as
yet att a stand.”33 Five months later, Thompson still felt that “to adven-
ture our fleet of necessity must be lessned, & the Holland capers will
increase, soe that I conclude much more hazard.”34 By opting not to
“adventure his fleet” and keeping his plans for “dispatching away a
ship … att a stand,” Thompson lost out on business. His cautious
approach on this occasionwas perhaps vindicated, as othermerchants,
despite the warnings of dangers at sea, continued to pursue trade but
had their vessels or goods taken by enemy vessels. Less than a week
after the second war broke out, Thomas Dobson and his ship, the
Exchange of Yarmouth, were “taken by a holand Caper of 6 or 8 guns
out of theire flett.”35 On hearing of “a small dutch caper” taking prizes
off the Irish coast near Donaghadee in August 1665, George McCartney
felt that “it is a great shame that such a small rogue should have libertie
to stay heire it is shee thatwas heire in june last shewill doe great in this
channel if not soone persued.”36 It was, though, possible to avoid
capture when accosted by an enemy privateer. When George Harper
29. Farnell, “The Navigation Act of 1651,” 451.
30. Calendar of State Papers relating to English affairs in theArchives ofVenice,
vol. 37, Girolamo Alberti, Venetian secretary in England, to the Doge and Senate,
June 24, 1672, 231.
31. Rommelse, “English PrivateeringAgainst theDutchRepublic,” 17–18;Orm-
rod, The Rise of Commercial Empires, 276.
32. O’Brien, “Mercantilism and Imperialism,” 473.
33. Hull City Archives [HCA] DDFA/37/5, Henry Thompson to Thomas Ben-
son, April 19, 1653 [York].
34. HCADDFA/37/5, HenryThompson to Thomas Benson, September 27, 1653
[York].
35. NRO Y/L 13/24 [George Harper] to Thomas Pengelly, March 10, 1664/5,
Yarmouth.
36. Linenhall Library [LL] Outletter book of George McCartney, vol. I,
148, George McCartney to Joshua Allen, August 19, 1665, Belfast.
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recounted the loss of an English man-of-war during the Second Anglo-
DutchWar, he qualified the event by noting that “the captens are much
blamed it is sayde they might easely have rescued him.”37 McCartney
felt similarly when, in October 1665, his master Mr. Ravens “did fall
amonges 14 hollands men of war” but was taken only because the
weather was so calm: “if it had blowen any gale of wynd he sailed so
well that there wold have beene little hazard of him.”38 Captivity did
not stifle Mr. Ravens’s participation in commerce: he wrote to McCart-
ney while imprisoned to report that “goods are at a greate raite.”39
While some merchants were dissuaded from trading or fell prey to
privateers, others used various methods to adapt their approach to
business, continue to succeed, and even to exploit the conflict to max-
imize profit. The behavior of these merchants during the Anglo-Dutch
wars reflects that ofmerchants during other conflicts. In her study of the
Armada War of the sixteenth century, for example, Pauline Croft dem-
onstrates that merchants viewed war as an interruption rather than a
barrier, with “flexible responses” allowing trade between England and
Spain to continue, and Thomas Truxes notes the “adaptive and prag-
matic character” of those involved in eighteenth-century wartime
Atlantic commerce, describing the “fluidity, adaptability, and respon-
siveness to change” of mid-eighteenth-century Atlantic markets.40
Moreover, losses did not tend to be absolute. It was common practice
to “diversify risk”: merchants collaborated in owning parts of multiple
ships and avoided allowing all of their commodities to be shipped on a
single vessel.41 This was good business practice in peacetime aswell as
wartime: after the third war had been concluded, Thomas Baret still
instructed William Peacock that iron sent “by way of Rotterdam”
should “for security … come in two severall vessels.”42
In addition to diversifying risk, early-modern merchants used a
variety of methods to avoid trouble at sea as they continued to pursue
business during conflicts, and the merchants trading during the
37. NRO Y/L 13/24 [George Harper] to Thomas Pengelly, March 10, 1664/5,
Yarmouth.
38. LL Outletter book of George McCartney, vol. I, George McCartney to John
Sexton, October 25, 1665, 176; GeorgeMcCartney to Joshua Allen, October 25, 1665,
176–177.
39. LL Outletter book of George McCartney, vol. I, George McCartney to Joshua
Allen, October 25, 1665, Belfast, 176–177.
40. Croft, “Trading with the Enemy,” 302 and passim; Truxes, “Dutch and Irish
Cooperation,” 303; Truxes, “Transnational Trade in the Wartime North Atlantic,”
751.
41. de BruynKops,ASpirited Exchange, 5, 96; Rommelse, “Prizes and Profits,”
147; Forte, “Marine Insurance and Risk Distribution,” 394; Haggerty, “Merely for
Money?,” 62; Ormrod, “The Demise of Regulated Trading,” 253.
42. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to William Peacock, October 13, 1676,
Norwich, 227.
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Anglo-Dutchwarswere no exception. The threat of privateering caused
merchants to take extra care in selecting their vessels. During the sec-
ond war, George McCartney instructed John Brow that “if the war hold
still betwixt England and Holland that you wold be inquiring out for a
good little oostend veshell and to gett ane honnest master to her.”43
A week later, McCartney wrote to James Thrustone about “some Dutch
man of war that was upon the cost,” explaining that “they examine vere
striklie the french veshells for englishmens goods.”McCartneywas not
too perturbed, assuring Thrustone, “I will send out more in another
veshall,”44 but by the end of the August he was struggling to procure
any suitable ships. He wrote again to John Brow that:
the tymes are so now that men knowe not what to doe I wold have
fraughted a french veshell…but they are not to be fraughted for no
money I wrote to [Bordeaux] for on[e] and my friend wrot mee they
were so afrayed of wars with England that none wold adventure to
comehither… no veshells can I gett any to send out for in any English
ship I dar not hazard and the french not to be had so my desire is that
youwold letmee heare fromyouwhither ane ostend veshellmight be
had that wold goe saife to and againe… I mean if you could get a free
veshell and send her hither I will soone depart her to you againe for a
free veshell must be had other wayes there is no venturing.45
By October McCartney was casting his net even further, as “tymes ar
so unsertaine that doth not know whither to run fast or to go softlie
however in a Flemish veshell with a flemish companie I thinke there
will be little hazard.” McCartney put his money where his mouth
was, agreeing to “stand to on[e] third of her cargoe” for this voyage,
indicating his confidence that it would succeed despite inhibiting
factors.46 Adapting trading habits in this way was not easy; it required
perseverance and taking risks in using unfamiliar vessels to trade in
unknown markets.
It is important to note that the impact of the three conflicts was felt
beyondAnglo-Dutch exchanges. In part becausemerchants did not con-
fine their activities within national borders or along linear routes, to
ascertain the true impact of the Anglo-Dutch wars on business activity,
wemust look beyond the immediate participant nations, acknowledging
43. LL Outletter book of George McCartney, vol. I, 126, George McCartney to
John Brow, June 10, 1665, Belfast.
44. LL Outletter book of George McCartney, vol. I, 132, George McCartney to
James Thrustone, June 17, 1665, Belfast.
45. LL Outletter book of George McCartney, vol. I, 151, George McCartney to
John Brow, August 25, 1665, Belfast.
46. LL Outletter book of George McCartney, vol. I, 186, George McCartney to
William Watt, October 28, 1665, Belfast.
10 TALBOTT
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2021.1
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 86.23.78.145, on 18 May 2021 at 10:41:39, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
that merchants outside the Anglo-Dutch sphere were also compelled to
alter their methods of doing business during these conflicts. Merchants
participating in Anglo-Portuguese and Franco-Scottish trade, for exam-
ple, suffered during the third war. John Cooke wrote from Exeter to his
cousin in Porto, lamenting that
you cannot have that constant supply as formerly per reason of awarr
declared against the Dutch … wee have a general embargo upon all
ships; & none but such as have obtained protections are permitted to
depart neither are there any more of them procurable so that I cannot
now resolve whither shall send you any fish this season.47
The following year, Andrew Milner, William Watson, and John Pierce
sailed from Aberdeen to Le Havre in France with salmon and were
returning with a variety of commodities, including hats, paper, and
hoops for straw bales, when they were taken by “ane hollands caper”
captained by Jan Jacobson, who wrecked the ship and some of the
merchandise and held William Logan, one of the merchants on the
ship, to ransom.48 To counter these problems, merchants involved in
Anglo-Portuguese trade adopted a hierarchy ofmethods to protect their
business. In June 1673 William Selay wrote from Exeter to Cooke in
Porto that “heare is no convoy for O Porto, and its verry hazerdous
sendeinge goods” and asked Cooke to send his merchandise
for bristoll, or London, in any good vessel with convoy, or if no
convoy presents, may sende in a Portuguese without convoy; but
then you muste remember the bills of Loadinge may be in some
Portuguese name; in cause shoulde meate with capers, and let not
your letter per the vessel contradicte the bill of loadeinge.49
Selay makes clear here his hierarchy of protections—first, to utilize a
convoy; second, to send goods in a Portuguese ship, but in the latter
case making sure to alter paperwork in case of capture. Two months
later, Humphry Yeo adopted the same hierarchical approach, asking
John Cooke to “pray faile not to sende mee more oyles per first vessel
bounde for this port with convoy or per a Portuguez carvell or other free
ship.”50
47. Massachusetts Historical Society [MHS], Jefferies Family Papers, vol. 25,
John Cooke to John Cooke, April 8, 1672, Exeter.
48. Aberdeen City Archives, Propinquity Book I, June 7, 1673, fo. 101r.
49. MHS, Jefferies Family Papers, vol. 26, William Selay to John Cooke, June
5, 1673, Exeter.
50. MHS, Jefferies Family Papers, vol. 26,HumphreyYeo to JohnCooke,August
14, 1673, Exeter.
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Sailing under the protection of a convoy, where one was available,
minimized the danger to merchants from privateers. During the third
war, Thomas Baret placed his trust in a safe convoy, instructing Row-
land Cockey that “youwould not adventure above £2: or £300 vallue in
one bottum unless you see safety in the conveyance & good convoy &
then send as you thinke convenient,”51 suggesting that he would
approve a reduction in the level of diversification if his goods were
shipped under a convoy. The falsification of documentation contem-
plated by Selaywas a commonmethod of overcoming the difficulties of
trading during conflict. Despite his earlier reticence, Henry Thompson
askedThomas Benson during the first war to “load in dutchmans name
pretending for Holland or some other plase and take first port as New-
castle, take notice what you say for corsars and gods willing shall make
a voyage.”52 During the second war, George McCartney asked William
Watt to instruct their vessel “if they meet with dutch or french men of
ware as they come backe to pretend they are bound for Norway and to
have some papers to that effect.”53 Using neutral carriers and falsifying
paperwork were widely used and regularly effective methods, but they
did not guarantee success. Despite the idea that “war created opportu-
nities for neutral carriers,”54 Steve Murdoch has demonstrated the
impact of the First Anglo-Dutch War on neutral parties, showing that
England seized a number of neutral Swedish vessels, which was
“costly, time-consuming and potentially devastating” to those caught
up in the conflict.55
In looking beyond the immediate participant nations of England and
the Netherlands, wemust also consider that there was a broader British
dimension to all three of theAnglo-Dutchwars. Somewhat understand-
ably, given theirmoniker, existing analyses of theAnglo-Dutchwars are
predominately Anglocentric. To understand the conflicts fully, how-
ever, the wider British context must be a central part of any evaluation
of them. Scotland entered the Anglo-Dutch wars under different rules
of engagement and separate legal jurisdiction from England,56 and
Steve Murdoch, Andrew Little, and Angelo Forte note in their study
of the Third Anglo-DutchWar that “Scotlandwas asmuch a combatant
nation as England … thus the title of the war as Anglo-Dutch is
51. NROMS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Rowland Cockey, February 10, 1672/3,
Norwich, 8.
52. HCA DDFA/37/5, Henry Thompson to Thomas Benson, April 19, 1653
[York].
53. LL Outletter book of George McCartney, vol. I, 233, George McCartney to
William Watt, March 24, 1665/6, Belfast.
54. Shovlin, “War and Peace,” 313.
55. Murdoch, “’Breaching Neutrality’,” 146.
56. Murdoch, The Terror of the Seas?, 238.
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something of amisnomer.”57 The fact that Scottish privateers “played a
very significant part in the disruption of Dutch commerce”58 during the
Anglo-Dutch wars proves, Murdoch argues, that “Scotland punched
well above her weight throughout the maritime conflict.”59
As a nation, Scotland benefited in a number of ways from involve-
ment in the Anglo-Dutch wars. The legacy of Scotland’s participation
has been described as “economic, technical and legal … [giving] the
Scotland of the 1680s the necessary prerequisite for a successful
infiltration of the trade and colonial markets of others, including
the English.”60 Scotland was allegedly transformed “from a relatively
insignificant outpost of the northern European trading community to
that of an aggressive participant in the rapidly expanding Atlantic
economy,” and England’s acquisition of Dutch technology during the
wars, as mentioned earlier, spread north of the border.61 Like their
English counterparts, Scottish merchants continued to work for per-
sonal gain. Some operated as privateers, profiting from the sale of
prizes.62 During the third war, despite a royal proclamation prohibit-
ing Scottish subjects from operating in any foreign service, Henry
Martin captained the French privateer the Sharlot of Calais. Once
the conflict had concluded, Martin petitioned the Admiralty Court
of Scotland for a letter of protection from Charles II that would
provide him with immunity from prosecution. The Privy Council
granted this request.63
One of the methods employed by both English and Scottish mer-
chants during the Anglo-Dutch wars was simply to cooperate with one
another. In 1653 the Hull merchant Henry Thompson recognized the
benefits to be gained from doing business with Scottish counterparts,
writing to John Lussignet: “pray informe me from Edenburgh, upon
what certainty a vessel may goe & how you would steer to get the
securest way from danger.”64 In May 1654 Thompson made it clear
that Scotland was a viable alternative for goods if war continued,
instructing James DuCornet to make his vessel “a fre ship of your part”
and in sending goods back “addresse the vessel for Amsterdam we
being att peace, or Edinburgh in Scotland.”65 Further, official
57. Murdoch, Little, and Forte, “Scottish Privateering,” 37.
58. Murdoch, Little, and Forte, “Scottish Privateering,” 53, 38
59. Murdoch, The Terror of the Seas?, 6, 330.
60. Graham, “The Scottish Marine,” 74. Arguably, Scotland already had access
to colonial markets: Macinnes, Union and Empire, 137, 150, 157–171, 183.
61. Graham, “The Scottish Marine,” 67.
62. Graham, “The Scottish Marine,” 71
63. National Records of Scotland [NRS] AC7/4, Register of Decreets, Supplica-
tion of Henry Martin, August 6, 1675, Edinburgh.
64. HCA DDFA/37/5, Henry Thompson to John Lussignet, July 30, 1653 [York].
65. HCADDFA/37/5, Henry Thompson to James DuCornet, May 2, 1654 [York].
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assistance from Scotland was seen as a realistic possibility. Later in
May, Thompson informed DuCornet of his intention to ask John
Lussignet “if [he] could have procured the king of Scots protection
for our vessell from all his men of war.”66 Although Scotland would
be included in Westminster’s declaration of war on the Dutch in
1665, by the end of the previous year, the Dutch had been formally
ordered to avoid the threat of English privateers in the Channel by
sailing around the north coast of Scotland,67 a practice already being
utilized by Dutch merchants.68 This practice became so common that
English authorities discussed the possibility of building forts in Scot-
land to prevent it,69 perhaps to force the Dutch back through the
Channel and make them easier prey. As war continued, most of the
Atlantic trade of northern Europe began to round Scotland rather
than sail through the Channel,70 avoiding a route that presented a
higher risk. Scottish merchants, too, recognized the benefit of British
cooperation: during the third war, Alexander Gillespie, a skipper
from Elie in Fife, continued to trade from his native Scotland with
protection from a Newcastle convoy, highlighting that merchants of
the still politically independent British nations cooperated with each
other to facilitate commerce.71 The actions of English, Scottish, and
Dutch merchants alike underline the importance of considering the
wider British dimension both to the conflicts themselves and to the
business undertaken during them.
So far we have looked at merchants who ceased trading and those
who employedmethods such as using convoys or falsifying papers, but
there is a third group of merchants to consider—those who accepted
that their usual routes of tradewere closed off andwho broadened their
horizons, rather than ceasing their business and allowing the conflicts
66. HCA DDFA/37/5, Henry Thompson to James DuCornet, May 16, 1654
[York].
67. National Archives, Kew [TNA] SP84/173/69, Downing to Bennett,
December 16, 1664, The Hague.
68. TNA SP84/173/65-8, Downing to Bennett, November 2, 1664, The Hague,
reported “2 from Amsterdam…neer ready to sett saile with intent to go round
Scotland.” Although the intention was to avoid problems caused by conflict with
England, Rommelse argues that these tactics in fact caused additional problems for
the Dutch, as trade was delayed and there was a knock-on effect on the re-export
trade, both of which reduced profitability: Rommelse, “Prizes and Profits,” 152.
69. TNASP84/174/84, De Bacquoy to Bennett, February 14, 1665, Leeuwarden;
Calendar of State Papers relating to English affairs in the Archives of Venice, vol. 34,
Alvise Saguedo, Venetian ambassador in France to the Doge and Senate, January
9, 1665, 74–75.
70. Graham, “The Scottish Marine,” 69.
71. University of St. Andrews Special Collections [UStASC], ms38352, Alexan-
der Gillespie”s logbook, 36. For this phenomenon in the French context see Talbott,
Conflict, Commerce and Franco-Scottish Relations, 149.
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to prevent them from thriving.72 Our Hull merchant, Henry Thompson,
was aware of “severall ships att Hull boun for severall places as leiden
oostend etc I have thoughts of putting this cloth abord someof themand
soe dispose of it.”73 John Cooke’s cousin, after reporting his inability to
send goods during the thirdwar, added “you shall have amore certaine
account per a vessell that may depart 5 weeks hence via Gijón.”74 In
March 1673, with the third war interrupting his primary trade with
Amsterdam, Thomas Baret asked William Fittz, “Whether you doe
thinke that any of my comodityes would sell in Antwerpe or not.”75
This broadening of horizonsmanifested itself in commodities aswell as
geographies: as he continued to experience difficulties selling his cloth,
Thompsonwrote that “iff anydutchmanhave any commoditye in these
parts I would take it in liue of them.”76 This incident suggests two
things: first, that Thompsonmoved to accept “any commoditye” in lieu
of payment, even if it was a commodity he was not familiar with;
second, that he had no scruples about exchanging goods with a Dutch
merchant despite their nations being at war. This reflects merchant
behavior in other contexts. As Jean Agnew notes in her study of mer-
chant families in seventeenth-century Belfast, “political restrictions on
trade did not impose any kind of moral obligation on merchants and
trading with the enemy was not seen as unpatriotic,” and Thomas
Truxes shows that in the eighteenth century, the “Dutch … had few
scruples about tradingwith enemies—their ownor anyone else’s.”77 By
adjusting their methods and expanding their markets, and by not hold-
ing themselves to the political ideologies of the conflicts, merchants
were merely inconvenienced by the wars, rather than being ruined.
There is yet another group of merchants who, notwithstanding com-
plications arising from war with the Dutch, continued to trade in their
usual way. When Dutch privateers threatened Samuel Davis’s trade in
chintzes from Yarmouth to Spain in 1666, Davis nonetheless wrote to
72. This has been shown in other contexts, including during the British Civil
Wars and the Anglo-FrenchWar of 1665–1666 (whichwas part of the SecondAnglo-
Dutch War): Talbott, Conflict, Commerce and Franco-Scottish Relations, 91–92,
95, 98, 105.
73. HCA DDFA/37/5, Henry Thompson to Thomas Benson, April 19, 1653
[York].
74. MHS, Jefferies Family Papers, vol. 25, John Cooke to John Cooke, April
8, 1672, Exeter. Gijón, a port in northern Spain, can also be rendered “Xixón.” The
hand in this letter is inconsistent, and although Gijón makes contextual sense, this
transcription is uncertain. I thank Dr. Alex Bamji for assistance in deciphering this
place name.
75. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to William Fittz, March 10, 1672/3, Nor-
wich, 13.
76. HCA DDFA/37/5, Henry Thompson to John Drew [May 10, 1653] [Hull].
77. Agnew, Belfast Merchant Families, 116; Truxes, “Dutch and Irish
Cooperation,” 330.
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Thomas Pengelly that “if you shall thinke it convenient for me to
adventor I shall bee willing to doe as you account best for me.”78
Davis and Pengelly’s business relationship survived the second war
and remained active into the third, during which Davis reported to
Pengelly that although spices were cheaper in Holland than in
London there was an added danger that they “may be taken by the
customehouse her[e] and then they are all gone.” Despite this, Davis
was once again content to be guided by Pengelly, assuring him that “I
shall observ your order the first opportunity.”79 This correspondence
suggests little change in the dynamic of this business relationship
between the second and third wars (a relationship in which Pengelly
was the dominant partner), as well as highlighting that this relation-
ship survived the problems of the second war to remain active into
the third. Not all merchants were anxious regarding the hazard of
continuing trade: William Selay, who we met earlier, altered his
trading methods in reaction to the threat of war, but his business
partner John Cooke did not share Selay’s anxieties, assuring his
Porto-based cousin and namesake that “if there bee any vessel pro-
curable & the hazard not very considerable you may expect a perfor-
mance of my promise.”80
There were several ways in which merchants took advantage of the
war to increase their profits—not merely surviving the conflict but
thriving through new opportunities. One way was by taking privateer-
ing commissions, for which their knowledge of maritime trade and
commodity exchange was an advantage.81 Many merchants were pro-
active, pursuing potential opportunities even before they were forced
into this stance by a declaration of war and choosing to actively pursue,
rather than avoid, trading with nations beset by conflict. France did not
enter the second war until April 1666, but eight months previously,
GeorgeMcCartney wrote to Thomas Hackett that hewould not proceed
with trade “til I see how thewarwithFrance be ornot”;82 not becausehe
did not want to trade during a war, but so that he could adjust his
business methods to achieve the maximum profit. In writing to John
Prouse, McCartney explained the potential advantages of a war with
France: “if youdele in butter itwere good youdealle at first… these that
have goods there the money will give a good value being no goods can
78. NROY/L 13/27, Samuel Davis to Thomas Pengelly, July 6, 1666, Yarmouth.
79. NRO Y/PP 7/3, Samuel Davis to Thomas Pengelly, April 20, 1674, London.
80. MHS, Jefferies Family Papers, vol. 25, John Cooke to John Cooke, April
8, 1672, Exeter.
81. Lunsford, Piracy and Privateering, 183–184. See also Groenveld “The
English Civil Wars as a Cause of the First Anglo-Dutch War,” 548, 551.
82. LL Outletter book of George McCartney, vol. I, 145, George McCartney to
Thomas Hackett, August 5, 1665, Belfast.
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goe from England.”83 Fourmonths before the outbreak of the third war,
George Northleigh andWilliam Hodges wrote from Livorno to Thomas
Pengelly that “if warre with the French & Dutch” broke out, “lead &
pepper will gaine in estime.”84 Once war had begun, not all merchants
were dissuaded from proposing new speculations. John Ellington,
another of Thomas Pengelly’s business associates, wrote two months
before peace was agreed at Breda that he had bought a new trading
vessel, choosing to invest in this asset at a timewhen the seas remained
perilous.85 In March 1673 Thomas Baret boasted to Thomas Shephard
that “if you incourage I will send you patterns of comodityes fitt to be
worne bymen by women by children for I deale in all sorts to the Court
of England as well as to Amsterdam.”86
Given these approaches, it is not surprising that there are examples
of merchants celebrating the wars: in 1664 Christopher Lowther, an
apprentice to a Turkey merchant, wrote to his father that “a successful
war will bee of no less advantage … this trade may in processe of time
bee of infinite advantage boath to Kinge & people & us the managers
especially.”87 InNovember 1665, GeorgeMcCartney specifically stated
that “if thewarswith Holland continiewmay doe us good,”88 and Baret
noted in February 1673 that the value of his goods was rising “because
few if any as the constitution of affairs now are will adventur to send
any of these goods over.”89 As these experienced traders realized, war
reduced supply, removed competition, and allowed those merchants
continuing with their business to increase their profit. By being proac-
tive, drawing on their impressive understanding of international poli-
tics, taking advantage of fluctuations in supply and demand, managing
risk, and being flexible in their approaches, merchants were able to
exploit conflict for financial gain.
The advent of peace, too, presented merchants with further oppor-
tunities, and it is telling that those very merchants who navigated the
wars successfully were also prepared to navigate a shift to peace.
Although it has been suggested that “the prospect or advent of peace
83. LL Outletter book of George McCartney, vol. I, 155, George McCartney to
John Prouse, August 29, 1665, Belfast.
84. NRO Y/L 13/48, George Northleigh and William Hodges to Thomas Pen-
gelly, January 15, 1671/2, Livorne (Leghorn).
85. NRO Y/L 13/35, John Ellington to Thomas Pengelly, May 21, 1667, Leith.
86. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Thomas Shephard, March 26, 1673,
Norwich, 22.
87. Carlisle Archive Centre D LONS L1/1/15, Christopher Lowther to Sir John
Lowther, August 31, 1664, London.
88. LL Outletter book of George McCartney, vol. I, 191, George McCartney to
John Scouller, November 18, 1665, Belfast.
89. NROMS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Rowland Cockey, February 19, 1672/3,
Norwich, 12.
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seems to have led to a surge of unsuccessful risk-taking,”90 the ways
in which some merchants planned for peace during the Anglo-Dutch
wars highlights their astuteness. When planning for business post-
war, Thomas Baret recognized that if he acted quickly, he could
benefit: “I am now in greate hopes wee shall have a peace & therfore
if there be any comodityes fitt for my sale heere which would rise if a
peace dus come I should be willinge that you lay out 2 or 3 hundred
pounds for me … I would take the opportunity to draw before the
exchange dus rise,”91 thus capitalizing on favorable rates available
during the conflict that would disappear with the coming of peace.
Indeed, the very advent of peace was seized on as an opportunity:
Baret was actively preparing for peace as early as April 1673 by
planning to manufacture commemorative cloth, sending to Rowland
Cockey
some patterns of such stuffs as are the mode with us … the silke in
future may bemade into orrange or any collour you order… I may be
early to salute a peace in your contrey with prince collors & if you
sendme all the princes collours I will indeavour to mix them soe in a
stuff.92
Being able to deal reactively to or to plan proactively for both the onset
of war and the onset of peace suggests that capacity for success had
more to do with merchants’ abilities and adaptability than with the
broader political situation.
When merchants caught wind of the notion that peace might be
approaching, they reacted in myriad ways, reflecting the various ways
in which they were affected by the conflicts. Some merchants greeted
rumors of peace with raised spirits and boosted confidence. In May
1667, two months before the Treaty of Breda was signed, George
McCartney wrote to Nicholas Gareldine “that treatie at breda can agree
upon peace I hope trade and commercewill reveive again.”93 Twodays
following the signing of the treaty, Deveraux Parry had “no newes at
present” of the proclamation of peace, but reported to Thomas Pengelly
that “Mr John Langly tould mee this day that his friend to whom you
sent the patterns from Amsterdam writes him that if hee had those
goodes nowe hee did nott question but could putt them of to good
90. Hoppit, Risk and Failure in English Business, 98.
91. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Rowland Cockey, January 26, 1673/4,
Norwich, 57.
92. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Rowland Cockey, April 11, 1673,
Norwich, 24.
93. LL Outletter book of George McCartney, vol. I, George McCartney to Nich-
olas Gareldine, May 4,1667, Belfast, 359.
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advantage to be sould.”94 Indeed, the next month Parry wrote of his
intention to “ship the 100 pieces mixt serges… for Amsterdam.”95 Just
halfway through the third conflict Thomas Baret reacted to rumors of
peace by explaining that “the present discourse of peace or rather a
treaty dus incourage me to request you to send away noe more goods
(that is retorne goods) till further order.”96 That the wait for peace to be
agreed interrupted his business plans does not seem to have frustrated
Baret unduly; on February 13, he exclaimed: “The good newse of a
peace betuixt England & Holland although I have long wished for it
yet now really it is come sooner then I could expect it butt not any thinge
the less welcome be for that it doeth revive my spirits & I hope it will
revive trade.”97
In light of the ways in which merchants continued to pursue their
business in spite of the conflicts, and others benefited directly from
them, it is unsurprising that others greeted the cessation of war with
despondency. A return to an open market and wider competition was
not welcomed by some of those who had found a way to be successful
during wartime. Indeed, “if the threat of war caused problems, then
the threat and reality of peace also demanded readjustments.”98
Although Henry Thompson initially balked at the idea of trading in
an uncertain market, as examined earlier, we have also seen that he
overcame those fears, utilizing foreign shipping and alternative mar-
kets to allow him to continue his business. His methods were ulti-
mately so successful that when news of the first Peace of Westminster
reached him in March 1654, fears of a saturated market stirred him to
write two letters on the same day, one to John and Joseph Drew in
Amsterdam to “conjecture wee shall have suddently vessels either
from Amsterdam or Rotterdam,”99 and one to Thomas Benson com-
plaining that “if peace be with the Hollanders I feare this ordinary
way of trade will not be very benificiall.”100 This example suggests
two things: first, not all merchants looked forward to the return of
peacetime trading, as they were accustomed to the opportunities
94. NRO Y/L 13/38, Deveraux Parry to Thomas Pengelly, August 2, 1667,
London.
95. NRO Y/L 13/40, Deveraux Parry to Thomas Pengelly, September 10, 1667,
London.
96. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Rowland Cockey, March 26, 1673,
Norwich, 20.
97. NROMS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Rowland Cockey, February 13, 1673/4,
Norwich, 59.
98. Hoppit, Risk and Failure in English Business, 129.
99. HCA DDFA/37/5, Henry Thompson to John and Joseph Drew, March
24, 1653/4 [York].
100. HCA DDFA/37/5, Henry Thompson to Thomas Benson, March 24, 1653/4
[York].
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offered by war; and second, merchants did not necessarily fall cleanly
into one of the categories of responses examined throughout this
section. At different junctures, Henry Thompson opted not to trade,
utilized various methods to continue his business, and later went so
far as to lament the coming of peace.
Merchants’ Concerns
In examining the behavior of merchants during the three Anglo-Dutch
wars,we have seen that they employed a variety ofmethods to continue
to make a profit despite the problems caused by war. Merchants’ cor-
respondence also sees them voicing concerns about conducting busi-
ness during periods of conflict, including merchants who were able to
adjust their trading methods successfully. During the third war,
Thomas Baret wrote to Rowland Cockey that “my feares doe make me
to advice & request you to make what possible hast you cann to convey
away my goods from Amsterdam to some more secure place.”101
Despite Cockey’s “apprehentions of safety in Amsterdam … its my
owne thoughts & all my friends that there can be noe long safety in that
place unless the discource of peace.”102 Two months later Baret
declared himself to be “now againe full of feares … for methinks the
peace looks farther off us then we desire it should.”103 In June, Baret
added that “as to trade I see you have but little, nor are you like to have
much, this beeing the time of action, I must confess I am some what
unwilling to adventure any more goods as yet.”104
Although in isolation such evidence suggests first that concerns
about conflict were foremost in merchants’ minds and second that
the timing of these business problems means that they were caused
by the Anglo-Dutch wars, closer examination of such correspondence
suggests otherwise. In fact, in-depth analysis of this material reveals a
broad rangeof difficulties facedbymerchants,manyofwhich cannot be
attributed to conflict, and which frequently take up more room in
business correspondence than concerns regarding war. The
mid-1660s were not the most propitious time to maintain business,
even if the Second Anglo-Dutch War is taken out of the equation, as
101. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Rowland Cockey, January 17, 1672/3,
Norwich, 7.
102. NROMS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Rowland Cockey, February 10, 1672/3,
Norwich, 8.
103. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Rowland Cockey, April 30, 1673,
Norwich, 27.
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disease spread throughout Europe and the Great Plague and the Great
Fire prevented freedom of movement and exchange in England. In
August 1664, Sir George Downing reported from The Hague that “the
plague increaseth mightily in this country … it is scattered in all
Townes of Holland… I thinke those of Scotland have not bin ill advised
in prohibiting all trade with this country.”105 The “sicknesse” in
England in August 1665 prevented George McCartney finding insur-
ance, and he noted that he “dar not hazard a whole loading upon my
oune account.”106 Attempts by merchants to undertake business
despite the plague were quickly curtailed. Edinburgh merchants trav-
eled to the City of London “beginning commerce and trade, and adven-
turing to bring into this Kingdome all Comodities as formerly,” despite
the fact that “the Plague is not yet altogether ceased.” This prompted a
proclamation in Edinburgh in December 1665 reiterating a prohibition
on trade with London due to “the danger and fear of infection.”107 The
Great Fire the following year not only required the rebuilding of
London but impacted on overseas trade, as it struck “the commercial
heart” of the city.108
Indeed, when surviving merchants’ correspondence is examined in
more detail, we see that discussion of war takes up surprisingly little
space and that many concerns were about issues unrelated to the polit-
ical context. Elevenmonths after the conclusion of the thirdwar, Henry
Ashhurst, a Londonmerchant,wrote to JohnBridges inAmsterdam that
“it is very dangerous to go in or out in the winter from Amsterdam I am
pleased you have insured,” citing the weather as his concern.109 Five
months later, SamuelDavis,whohadbeen content to continue business
during both the second and third wars, wrote to Thomas Pengelly of a
number of complaints, including sickness in his family and the cost of a
doctor, andmoaned that “my trade is soe smale and inconsiderable and
provission of all sorts soe very deare as I do not receive enough in a
weeke to discharge my expenses.” Davis’s jealousy of other, more suc-
cessful Norfolk merchants was palpable: “I wish I had [Mr. Tayler’s]
105. TNA SP84/171/107, Downing to Bennett, August 4, 1664, The Hague.
106. LL Outletter book of George McCartney, vol. I, George McCartney to John
Brow, August 25, 1665, Belfast, 151. These were long-term concerns; McCartney
raised fears about the plague both in England and abroad to numerous recipients
throughout the following year: McCartney to John Sexton, August 25, 1665, 152;
McCartney to Richard Huish, August 26, 1665, 154; McCartney to John Sexton,
September 9, 1665, 159; McCartney to Daniel Arthoure, May 12, 1666, 243–244;
McCartney to William Watt, May 23, 1666, 246.
107. Beinecke BrSides 1999 126, Proclamation discharging trade and commerce
with the City of London, December 21, 1665.
108. Rommelse, “Mountains of Iron and Gold,” 263.
109. Bodleian MS. Don. c. 169, Henry Ashhurst to John Bridges, January
15, 1674/5, London.
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trade friends & helpes he have had to gitt such an estate as he have done
in 8 years time,” concluding “I am confident a slave in Turkey lives not
amore dejected discontented life then I doe.”110 For some, war was not
uppermost in their list of complaints.
The Norwich merchant and cloth manufacturer Thomas Baret, who
has featured throughout this article, provides an ideal case study
through which to examine the range of concerns exhibited by early-
modernmerchants.111 For Baret, one of themost pressing concernswas
his manufacturing business. In June 1675, despite peace between
England and the Dutch, Baret struggled to acquire raw materials, writ-
ing that “I can not gett yarne enough.”112 The next month Baret was
finding it “difficult to geet good mixt wool yarnes to keepe those lombs
that I have in worke.”113 He struggled to manufacture a stuff “soe
difficult to make … that my workemen will leave rather than goe
on.”114 Baret commented that one of his commissions was “a very
teedous comodity tomake, it swallows a vast deele of yarne & is 14 days
to worke a piece.”115 In August 1674 Baret felt obliged to confess to a
customer that “these… are not soe good as I would have had, I putt new
persons upon them whoe could not hitt right at first but you shall have
better in future.”116AlthoughBaret’s problemswere exacerbated by the
third war—in June 1673 he responded to a complaint regarding the
quality of goods he had sent to Holland by explaining that “the truth is
the cessation of my Holland trade hath caused me to employ these
workemen in English comodityes which I use[d] to employ in Hollands
comodityes”117—Baret’s fundamental problems in manufacturing
rarely had much to do with the political climate. His inexperience in
textile manufacturing showed as he struggled to manage his workmen
and produce complex fabrics. We know that his manufacturing opera-
tion was large,118 and it may be that he attempted more than he was
110. NRO MC 265/3, Samuel Davis to Thomas Pengelly, June 13, 1675, Yar-
mouth.
111. Talbott, ed., The Letter-Book of Thomas Baret.
112. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Rowland Cockey, June 3, 1674, Nor-
wich, 77.
113. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Rowland Cockey, July 15, 1674, Nor-
wich, 88.
114. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Rowland Cockey, June 3, 1674,
Norwich, 77.
115. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Rowland Cockey, July 1, 1674, Nor-
wich, 85.
116. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Rowland Cockey, August 5, 1674,
Norwich, 98.
117. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Rowland Cockey, April 30, 1673,
Norwich, 31.
118. In 1661, six looms was thought to be an “unusually large number”: Priestly,
“The Fabric of Stuffs,” 195.We know fromBaret’s letter-book that he had at least four
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really capable of. While Norwich weavers were primarily craftsmen,
overseeing all aspects of manufacturing and being present in their
workshops,119 Baret was more heavily involved in marketing his pro-
duce than in the day-to-day process of manufacture. This left less time
to deal effectively with manufacturing problems as they arose.
The role of networks and the importance of credit, trust, and
reputation in early-modern business have received a great deal of
academic scrutiny in recent years.120 The merchants who continued
to operate during the Anglo-Dutch wars, including Thomas Baret,
demonstrably made use of contacts not only for practical assistance
but to gauge the likelihood of success, and the presence of a trusted
associate increased the likelihood of continuing trade. In February
1673, Thomas Baret had ordered “a totall withdrawinge my wholle
conserns from Amsterdam,” but on learning that Rowland Cockey
would “still abide there & that there is some small trade to be driven
there I will not totally desert you & that place but lett some small
stock runn the fate of the place … I will keepe a small trade goeinge
as long as you stay there.”121 In June Baret was adamant that he was
“unwilling to adventure any more goods as yet … the danger of the
present warr dus make me at present unwilling,” but asked nonethe-
less: “Could your freinds give me any incouragement.”122
The importance of these networks helps to explain the extent to
which Baret was angered when his business associates did not fulfill
their part of the bargain. Indeed, Baret’s fraught relationships with his
business associates—particularly Rowland Cockey, who played a sig-
nificant role in Baret’s tradewith Amsterdam—were one of his primary
grievances and were mentioned far more than the Third Anglo-Dutch
War, despite Baret continuing to trade throughout the conflict. In the
first entry in his letter-book, from November 1672, Baret insisted that
hismoney be “remitted…which please to doe per first conveniency for
really I am in want.”123 Cockey was admonished numerous times for
failing to send updated accounts, causing Baret to ask him inNovember
1673 to “send me one every six months.” Nonetheless, twelve months
in 1674, and he frequently refers to “all my loombs”: NROMS6360, 6B8, Letter-Book
of Thomas Baret of Norwich, 66, 74, 91, 105. See Talbott, ed., The Letter-Book of
Thomas Baret.
119. Priestly, “The Fabric of Stuffs,” 188.
120. See, for example, Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation; Haggerty, “Merely
for Money?”
121. NROMS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Rowland Cockey, February 19, 1672/3,
Norwich, 11.
122. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Rowland Cockey, June 11, 1673, Nor-
wich, 31–2.
123. NROMS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Rowland Cockey, November 27, 1672,
Norwich, 3.
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later, Baret had still “formanymonths beenedesiringe an accompt from
you after two yeares standinge.”124 In June 1675 Baret threatened to
withhold commissions until the accounts were received, and by
August, following numerous pleas for updated accounts, Baret
lamented that Cockey “neglect it which is not the part of friend nor
can it be called civill dealing … it doth not turne to your reputation to
have an accompt of towards five yeares now depending… now I must
make all best of a badd accompt.”125 ByOctober, Baretwas lamenting to
other associates—in this case William Peacock—that “as to Rowland
Cockey, Iwishhediddeale otherwaisewithhis friends thanhedoth, for
at the last the discreditwill light uponhimselfe, altho at present the loss
light upon others.”126 Throughout the five years covered by Baret’s
letter-book, we see his relationship with Cockey—once one of his most
prominent business associates—slowly disintegrate, owing largely to
Baret’s frustrations with how Cockey conducted himself in business.
This relationship broke down irrespective of the war, and the impor-
tance of personal relationships in this periodmakes it unsurprising that
this is so prominent in Baret’s correspondence, not only in his letters to
Cockey but also in his correspondence with his wider network.
Cultural differences, both in business methods and communication,
also caused problems. In August 1675, Baret wrote to Nathanial
Mathew, who was based in Hamburg, that he did not fully understand
an invoice, noting that “I have tryed it allwayes that I can invent but can
not givemy selfe ssatisfaction about it & therfore bynext pray cleare it to
me.” These were “the first goods that I have received from your parts &
must confes my selfe ignorant at present in your moneys & accompts.”
Baret admitted to Mathew that “I doe not soe well understand the
coarce of your exchange as I doe some others & therfore pray instruct
me what coarce of exchange is even money with starlinge & howmuch
every penny is in the rice or fall of the exchange.”127 When such
information was not forthcoming, Baret was not shy about revealing
his displeasure, reprimanding William Peacock for sending a letter
“which had noe price current in it.”128 Baret did business in a range
of textile commodities, but seventeenth-century Norwich stuffs are
124. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Rowland Cockey, November 4, 1674,
Norwich, 123.
125. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Rowland Cockey, August 11, 1675,
Norwich, 158-9.
126. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to William Peacock, October 13, 1675,
Norwich, 178.
127. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Nathaniel Mathew, August 27, 1675,
Norwich, 161-2.
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notoriously difficult to identify: there are no known survivals of Nor-
wich stuffs, and pattern books and samples only survive from the
1760s.129 This was a problem for contemporaries as well as today’s
historians: in June 1675, Baret wrote to John Dey
you are sorry that I send noe crowne rashes & truly I am sorry that I
doe not know what you meane by them & therfore if you would have
any you must send me a pattern of them or give me such description
as I may understand for I am sure wee have noe such name for any
comodity here.130
There was also a language barrier to contend with: Baret wrote to
Shephard regarding the “worthy person whome you have recom-
mended, Mr Jacomo Lemo, whoe beeing a Dutch man may possibly
be as farr from understanding my language as I should his.”131 Baret’s
unfamiliarity with the Dutch language may explain why so many of
his correspondents were English expatriates, rather than native
Dutchmen—this limited his capacity to trade more than the ongoing
war did.
Another of Baret’s chief concerns was his desire to operate in an
arena subject to a governmentally controlled monopoly held by the
Company of Merchant Adventurers of London. A regulated trading
company founded in the fifteenth century, the Merchant Adven-
turers were granted a monopoly on the export of cloth from England
in 1564. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Merchant
Adventurers “held unquestionable leadership in London’s mer-
chant community,”132 monopolizing the major export market in
semi-finished cloth. Baret continued to participate in the cloth
trade to the Netherlands as an independent agent during the Third
Anglo-Dutch War. Perhaps as a result of pressures caused by the
conflict and subsequent attempts to expand his business, he sought
to open trade with Hamburg and made repeated attempts to partake
in the activities of the Merchant Adventurers (or, as they were
termed by Baret throughout his letter-book, the Hamburg Com-
pany). In several letters to Thomas Shephard, a member of the
company, Baret complained about his exclusion from this trade.
In August 1673, he noted that “if I were a member of the Hambor-
ough Company you would afford me the utmost of your assistance
129. Priestly, “Marketing of Norwich Stuffs,” 195, 198; Talbott, ed. The Letter-
Book of Thomas Baret.
130. NROMS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to JohnDey, June 11, 1675, Norwich, 156.
131. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Thomas Shephard, March 26, 1673,
Norwich, 21.
132. Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, 3.
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… [but] amongst your selves you have made a resolution not to
deale for any butt such as are of the company.”133 Baret acknowl-
edged that the charter of the Merchant Adventurers “extends only
to London, I live 100 miles off from it,” but protested that the “Citty
of Norwich hath always had Hamborough marchants … till within
these last 40 years.”134 By July 1673, Baret was becoming irate. On
July 4, he penned a letter to Shephard that ultimately went unsent,
in which he stated that he “must acknowledge my selfe not to be
free of the Hamborough Company neither doe I know how to pro-
cure it & therefore I must totally defit trading to your ports & steere
my coarse of trade some other way.”135 Three days later, having
calmed himself somewhat, Baret wrote to Shephard in a more mea-
sured tone but still argued that he should be permitted to trade with
Shephard despite the monopoly of the Merchant Adventurers.136
Baret echoed the fears of many of those opposed to trading monop-
olies in protesting that “I doe thinke it some what hard in soe
generous a Company as yours is to discourage the new inventions
of our English manufactory.”137
Despite the Merchant Adventurers’ monopoly, this was not a
completely closed trade, and in principle, admission to the company
was open on payment of a “relatively nominal” entry fee.138 Despite
declaring himself “very thankfull to your court for admitting the sale of
my goods,” Baret decided that he was not willing to take up freedom of
the company. He objected to the oath of freedom, “which dos particu-
larly express Holland Zealand & the rest of the Low Contres with so
large an obligation to the Company that I cannot take this oath & con-
tinue the tradewhich I nowhave in the LowContrywithout breaking of
it.”139 Baretwas also reluctant to pay the entry fee, stating that “to be out
of money for a fredome before ever I can trye my experiment or be in a
probable way to gett soe much by the trade seemeth a litle hard.”140
Excluded from the Merchant Adventurers’ activities, at first by the
133. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Thomas Shephard, August 6, 1673,
Norwich, 42.
134. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Thomas Shephard, August 6, 1673,
Norwich, 43.
135. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Thomas Shephard, July 4, 1673, Nor-
wich, 34.
136. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Thomas Shephard, July 7, 1673, Nor-
wich, 34.
137. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Thomas Shephard, July 4, 1673, Nor-
wich, 34.
138. Ball, Merchants and Merchandise, 34; Bennett, “Migration,” 74.
139. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Thomas Shephard, September
29, 1674, London, 115.
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monopoly and later by choice, and trading during a volatile period, it
was important for Baret to tradewithin business networks that he knew
and trusted. In August 1675, Baret declared that “myway of tradinge is
not in Company but either upon my particuler accompt or elce in
commission,”141 after earlier warning Shephard that “I have a mind
to try to setle a trade in your parts & to doe it by our contrymens
hands.”142 As early as 1674, Baret was “drawinge up reasons & stating
the case to severall members in parliament & craving their advice upon
it with directions how I shall steere my coarse to effect a general liberty
of trade in your parts.”143 Such behavior perhaps reflects the growing
influence of some merchants on economic policy, as noted earlier, but
more significantly for this study, it is telling that the institutional
and bureaucratic barriers faced by Baret appear to have worried him
much more than any of the inconveniences caused by trading between
two countries at war. Certainly they occupy far more space in his
letter-book.
The role played by regulated companies like the Merchant
Adventurers is crucial to understanding international business,
but focus on institutional activities at the expense of those pursued
by independent agents can obscure the importance of the latter. The
contention that overseas trade—particularly between Europe and
the wider world—was “undertaken chiefly by state-chartered
monopoly trading companies”144 has contributed to the activities
of these companies being overprivileged in analyses of international
commerce. However, there are contexts in which nongovernmen-
tally controlled mercantile networks have been shown to be more
effective than ventures tied to companies or monopolies, and—as
Baret realized in turning down membership of the Merchant Adven-
turers—it could benefit merchants to be independent of the protec-
tionist schemes of governments, as it gave them freedom to trade
wherever markets were best.145 Further, as Michael Bennett has
argued, “Many of the merchants and agents who worked for trading
companies regularly subverted the instructions provided by the
141. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Nathaniel Mathew, August 27, 1675,
Norwich, 163.
142. NRO MS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Thomas Shephard, August 6, 1673,
Norwich, 43.
143. NROMS6360, 6B8, Thomas Baret to Thomas Shephard, January 23, 1673/4,
Norwich, 34.
144. Irwin, “Mercantilism as Strategic Trade Policy,” 1297. Irwin acknowledges
that intra-European trade was relatively less hindered by government monopoly
policies than trade between Europe and the rest of the world.
145. Murdoch, “Scotland and Europe,” 137; Murdoch, Network North, 423;
Dickson, “Introduction”; Talbott, Conflict, Commerce and Franco-Scottish Rela-
tions, 9.
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directors in London, by rejecting company authority [and] conduct-
ing commerce on their own private accounts.”146 The gradual
decline of the Merchant Adventurers’ dominance of the Anglo-
Dutch cloth trade during the seventeenth century is well documen-
ted and has been attributed in part to “the company’s trade to
Holland slowly disintegrat[ing] during the Anglo-Dutch wars.”147
The continuing activities of what David Ormrod describes as
“interlopers” in the trade, including Thomas Baret,148 however,
demonstrates that this is not the whole story of how England’s
seventeenth-century cloth trade was affected by the Anglo-Dutch
wars. By supplementing studies that consider broad, national con-
cerns with analysis of the actions of merchants “on the ground,” we
see the importance of considering business activities—and those
conducting them—at a practical level. Such an approach highlights
issues relating directly to the conflicts discussed here, but also
contributes to discussions surrounding other aspects of business
history, including monopolies, manufacturing, and the exchange
of information. Merchants were used to operating during periods
of war and were accustomed to adjusting their actions accordingly.
Far more concerning to them were the less predictable obstacles to
business, including unreliable workmen, cultural barriers, the
behavior of business associates, and the restrictions of monopoly
trade.
Conclusion
As Charles Boxer pointed out many years ago, “not all traders and
merchants in England were rivals and competitors of the Dutch,”149
and there aremore examples ofmerchants doing business directly with
their “enemy” during the Anglo-Dutch conflicts than there is room to
discuss here. The material I have considered suggests that the long-
standing scholarly tendency to view wartime commerce—and in par-
ticular the aims, ambitions, and successes of merchants—through the
lens of international political relationships is highly problematic.150
Jack Levy and Katherine Barbieri’s statement that “most international
trade takes place at the intersocietal level rather than the intergovern-
mental level—between private actors in different countries and not
146. Bennett, “Migration,” 74.
147. Ormrod, The Rise of Commercial Empires, 33.
148. Ormrod, The Rise of Commercial Empires, 124–125; Ormrod, “The Demise
of Regulated Trading,” 256, 259; see also Pettigrew, “Political Economy,” 62–63.
149. Boxer, Anglo-Dutch Wars, 20.
150. Talbott, Conflict, Commerce and Franco-Scottish Relations, 156–157.
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between governments themselves”151 would be recognizable to the
businessmenwho pursued profit intersocietally against the fluctuating
intergovernmental backdrop of the Anglo-Dutch wars. The arguments
highlighted in the introduction to this article characterizing the Anglo-
Dutchwars as damaging to commerce and business interests would not
be so recognizable among these contemporaries.152 Early-modern mer-
chants were used to operating during periods of war andwere prepared
for these eventualities. While some merchants exercised a growing
influence on policy, most were not preoccupied with worrying about
what they could not control. If we are to refine our assessments of the
impact of early-modern warfare on trade, we must go beyond consid-
eration of consequences for state economies and the activities of priva-
teers, to consider individual experiences, the myriad ways in which
business was impacted by war, and the resulting variety of ways in
which merchants coped with obstacles to their business.
In addition to providing a reassessment of the commercial impact of
the Anglo-Dutch wars, this study contributes to recent methodological
shifts in business history by applying their approaches to an arena hith-
ertonot considered in suchaway, consolidating the value of scrutinizing
the commercial impact of the Anglo-Dutch wars at a micro-level. British
merchants’ experiences of tradingwith the enemy during these conflicts
were diverse and encompassed a range of different techniques that had
varying degrees of success. Although, as acknowledged earlier, the three
wars considered here had different causes and consequences, the mer-
chants trading during them did not differentiate their coping mecha-
nisms—it made little difference to them what had caused the conflict.
Thomas Pengelly and Samuel Davis’s business relationship operated
during both the second and third wars, with similar approaches to their
operation—a rare example of surviving source material that allows us to
trackabusiness relationship through twoconflicts. Indeed, though Julian
Hoppit suggests that even when merchants coped well with the “early
problems” of the threat and outbreak of wars, “they tended to find them-
selves undone after a while,”153 the continued relationship of Pengelly
and Davis, as well as the protracted activities of the other merchants
examined here, suggests that their coping mechanisms allowed for
long-term business success despite the wars.
151. Levy and Barbieri, “Trading with the Enemy During Wartime,” 18; see also
Leng, “Commercial Conflict and Regulation,” 939, who shows that trade necessarily
took place outside the “bounds of the body politic,” as merchants prioritized private
interests.
152. Ormrod, The Rise of Commercial Empires, 37; Rommelse, “Mountains of
Iron and Gold,” 263; Rommelse, Second Anglo-Dutch War, 189–190; Israel, Dutch
Primacy in World Trade, 293–294; Ball, Merchants and Merchandise, 202.
153. Hoppit, Risk and Failure in English Business, 98.
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We have seen that some merchants suffered losses during the Anglo-
Dutch wars, but many more adjusted their trading methods, planning in
advance for expected disruption. The coping mechanisms employed
were varied. Options included the use of convoys, trading on neutral
ships, and falsifying papers, all of which necessitated taking additional
risks—trading inuntestedcommodities, onunknownships, inunfamiliar
markets, and with people outside their usual trusted networks—and as
wehave seen, usingperennialmethods such as diversification tomitigate
theadditional risks associatedwithcontinuingbusinessduringperiodsof
war. Somemerchants coped bywithdrawing themselves from themarket
and opting to cease trading; others benefited from this reduction in com-
petition, coping by expanding. As the reluctance of some merchants to
continue to pursueAnglo-Dutch trade left themarket open for others, the
likes of Henry Thompson and George McCartney were able to benefit to
thepoint that they lamented thereturnofpeaceand theconsequent return
to open competition. The most successful wartime merchants were pro-
active, keeping abreast of political developments and planning theirwar-
time business activities even before war had been declared. Further, not
all those who struggled during wartime did so necessarily because of the
wars themselves—the nature of international trade is that it “created
losers aswell aswinners”154 inbothwartimeandpeacetime, andwehave
seen that merchants more readily voiced anxieties about other, less pre-
dictable uncertainties than the commonplacematter of undertaking busi-
ness during a war.155 While merchants recognized the challenges posed
by international conflict, theyhadplentyofother,morepressingconcerns
to deal with, usually caused by the behavior of other individuals rather
than wider political issues. Given his continued success throughout the
Third Anglo-DutchWar, despite his ultimate exclusion from themarkets
of the Merchant Adventurers and other numerous struggles, it seems
fitting to leave the final word here to Thomas Baret, who believed that
“what cannot be helped must be indured.”156
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